Author: Raushan Tara Jaswal, Assistant Professor and PhD Candidate, Jindal Global Law School,O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonepat, Haryana

India’s recently published Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) target a 47% reduction in emissions by 2035. Additionally, India places itself among a select group of countries that have achieved one of their targets 5 years ahead of schedule. India has been a climate leader of the Global South and has passed a plethora of adaptation and resilience schemes, operationalised through the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) and its corresponding missions. These frameworks, missions, and schemes have been further decentralised under the country’s federal structure and are implemented by the states through the State Action Plans on Climate change (SAPCC). The framework is implemented in convergence with various schemes and programs of the central and State Governments, ensuring a coordinated, whole-of-government approach to climate-resilient and low-carbon development. SAPCCs are envisaged as a pillar of cooperative federalism, but in practice, they reveal their limits. 

Firstly, while envisaged as a tenant of the cooperative federalism dimension, the major issue is contestation. The problem of climate change is rarely without its political contestation – whether in the discourse between the Global South and the Global North, or in the contestation of goals between different states within a nation-state. In fact, the broader political economy of development is embedded in climate obligations alongside economic growth, employment generation, agricultural productivity, and even electoral considerations, highlighting negotiated compromises rather than focusing solely on coherent climate strategies. Especially in light of the lack of binding obligations, SAPCCs become instruments of policy discretion rather than enforceable obligations. With Centre-State relations currently underpinned by the political parties in power in each State versus the centrally dominant political party, it also becomes another site of contestation, especially given that financing frameworks are determined by the Central Government. 

In this context, this can be understood between the divergence of approaches applied in the Punjab and Haryana within their SAPCCs. While they are similarly situated states within the Indo-Gangetic Plains, relying heavily on groundwater extraction and primarily agricultural-dependent economies, their responses to the shared ecological and agricultural crises represent a sharp contrast. Whereas Punjab focuses on the wheat-paddy cycle, which is sustained by the Minimum Support Price regime, Haryana showcases a bid to experiment with crop diversification and sustainable water management strategies. This is not to overstate that one state seems to be doing better than the other; rather, they are constrained by broader national frameworks that underpin not only the NAPCC but also procurement policies, subsidy structures, the Centre’s fiscal dependence, political incentives, and the absence of enforceable climate goals. Another aspect in which such differences can be highlighted is with crop stubble (parali) burning. Punjab, due to its paddy cultivation and the intensity of its procurement-linked agricultural models, experiences higher incidents of stubble burning than Haryana, which benefits from stricter enforcement, more targeted subsidy distribution, and ex-situ residue management. The persistence of stubble burning also underscores how environmental externalities are effectively outsourced to neighbouring regions, most notably Delhi, which experiences severe winter air pollution partly attributable to these practices. This creates an additional layer of inter-state contestation, where blame is frequently shifted rather than responsibility collectively assumed. Moreover, the framing of stubble burning as a seasonal “law and order” issue obscures its structural roots in agricultural policy, subsidy regimes, and market incentives. Each state has adopted its own mix of regulatory measures and incentives, yet the resulting air pollution engulfs the entire Indo-Gangetic plain. What emerges is not merely policy divergence but a regulatory externality, in which one state’s choices impose costs on another. These problems can also be viewed through a political lens: the opposition has been in power in Punjab and Haryana, while the same party has been in power at the Centre.

This brings us to the second problem: the chronic lack of implementation. Most SAPCCs lack dedicated financing streams, relying instead on already stretched departmental budgets. Institutional capacity remains uneven, particularly in states with limited technical expertise in climate modelling, risk assessment, and adaptation planning.   While NAPCCs set the framework for state implementation, SAPCCs often do not align their goals or implementation strategies with those of others. Without mechanisms for coordination or harmonisation, these divergences undermine national climate coherence. India’s climate policy, rather than operating as a unified framework, is beginning to resemble a patchwork of competing experiments.

In other words, India’s climate federalism risks is reproducing the same inequities at the domestic level that it critiques globally. The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion provides a timely opportunity to catalyse this shift from mere political commitment to the assumption of binding legal obligations by strengthening domestic legal frameworks. While judicial intervention has led the way so far, it cannot be a substitute for legislative clarity.  If India is to sustain its position as a credible climate leader, it must confront the reality that ambition without implementation is performative, and decentralisation without accountability is dysfunctional. SAPCCs were intended to localise climate action; however, they are currently struggling between the tension of the Union-State relationship and policy-origins of federal climate action in India, causing more fragmentation than unification. Without reform, they risk localising its failure.